What role, if any, should emotions play in clinical reasoning and decision making? Traditionally, emotions have been excluded from clinical reasoning and decision making, but with recent advances in cognitive neuropsychology they are now considered an important component of them. Today, cognition is thought to be a set of complex processes relying on multiple types of intelligences. The role of mathematical logic or verbal linguistic intelligence in cognition, for example, is well documented and accepted; however, the role of emotional intelligence (...) has received less attention—especially because its nature and function are not well understood. In this paper, I argue for the inclusion of emotions in clinical reasoning and decision making. To that end, developments in contemporary cognitive neuropsychology are initially examined and analyzed, followed by a review of the medical literature discussing the role of emotions in clinical practice. Next, a published clinical case is reconstructed and used to illustrate the recognition and regulation of emotions played during a series of clinical consultations, which resulted in a positive medical outcome. The paper’s main thesis is that emotions, particularly in terms of emotional intelligence as a practical form of intelligence, afford clinical practitioners a robust cognitive resource for providing quality medical care. (shrink)

Since the publication of Edmund Gettier's challenge to the traditional epistemological doctrine of knowledge as justified true belief, Roberts and Wood claim that epistemologists lapsed into despondency and are currently open to novel approaches. One such approach is virtue epistemology, which can be divided into virtues as proper functions or epistemic character traits. The authors propose a notion of regulative epistemology, as opposed to a strict analytic epistemology, based on intellectual virtues that function not as rules or even as skills (...) but as habits of the heart. To that end, they divide the task of clarifying and expounding their notion in the book's two parts.In the first part, Roberts and Wood examine various components that constitute their notion of regulative epistemology. The first are the epistemic goods or goals that drive the epistemic process. What is needed, claim Roberts and Wood, is an enriched notion of these goods rather than the restricted notion of justified true belief. Epistemic agents are more than calculating devices in that …. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Bridge From Analysis to Action:Psychodynamic Analyses of Religion and Michael S. Hogue's American ImmanenceAJ Turner (bio)I. IntroductionThe purpose of this essay is to work constructively with Michael S. Hogue's groundbreaking American Immanence: Democracy for an Uncertain World to demonstrate how psychodynamic analyses of religion are essential theoretical allies in the fight for resilient democracy. The "revolution in mind"1 that psychodynamic approaches contribute, especially in their analyses of religion, (...) both complements and complicates socio-political theory as a whole. In the improvisational spirit of "yes-and," the goal here is not to identify and decry the failures and shortcomings of Hogue's theopolitical vision but rather to inspire the recovery of a sibling discourse—a kind of "rebirth of a forgotten alternative"2—that also draws deeply from the American immanental tradition in order to add psychodynamic depth to Hogue's timely and important analysis. Psychodynamic theories of religion shed light on how symbolic identifications, including and especially ultimate concerns, structure personal and collective experience. By engaging religion and theology sympathetically, constructively, and creatively, theorists such as Rollo May, Gordon Allport, Karen Horney, Erich Fromm, and Ernest Becker departed from the skepticism, reductionism, and dismissal that characterized psychoanalytic analyses of religion in the wake of Freud.3 Each of these figures, and especially Becker whose work will be a focus in this essay, are noteworthy interlocutors for extending Hogue's theopolitical theorizing of resilient democracy, particularly in how they drew unique inspiration from the American immanental tradition [End Page 44] in their social analyses. In this respect, they provide a more robust theorization of the psychosocial conditions of the associational ethos needed to connect Hogue's conception of resilient democracy with forms of agonistic organization and democratic activism. Briefly stated, psychodynamic approaches are a helpful bridge for connecting these proposals to strategies of organization, their impediments, and collective action.In this way, both psychodynamic analyses of religion and Hogue's theopolitical innovation insist that no revolutionary political change is possible, and certainly not of the kind or scale needed to counter our wickedly entangled global crises, without a deep engagement with theological imaginaries. They differ, however, in their theoretical aims. Whereas Hogue compellingly argues for the political upshot of a theology deriving from the American immanental tradition, psychodynamic analysts of religion focus on the function of ultimate concerns in individual and collective life. In other words, American Immanence rests on a methodology of analyzing the philosophical and theological assumptions that have contributed to our climate crises and then presenting clear and compelling articulation of an alternative paradigm meant to open up new ways of being. In contrast psychodynamic analyses leverage conceptual clarity of psychic reality for the fundamentally therapeutic aim of transformation. At their best, both approaches share what could be called an etiological orientation to ontological questions in order to provide liberative alternatives through rational understanding and clarification, but the terrain, and thus the problems they hope to mitigate in their analyses are focused differently. Extending the visual metaphor, they are different lenses highlighting different areas of the same landscape. Furthermore, it must be said that neither are sufficient in themselves, but the psychodynamic theorists of religion to be highlighted in this essay share deeply with Hogue's heading in American Immanence.II. A Problematic AssumptionIn emphasizing and attempting to explain4 the role of non-rational processes in the both individual and social processes of perception and organization of experience, psychodynamic theories confound a widely held and problematic assumption that the triumph of rational analysis is the hallmark for building the society to which we should aspire. Political theory in general, [End Page 45] especially as it has taken its cues from a rationalist legacy about the inherently liberating force of Reason, has been weighted toward an assumption that its task of exposing the mystifications of power would suffice in inspiring more "rational" and therefore necessarily equitable social organization. This speaks to the longstanding socio-political interest in "consciousness raising" tactics, which are often meant to dispel "false consciousness." It even comes across in the emphases of Deweyan pragmatists on education. Psychologists of all stripes point out that this approach... (shrink)

Our limited evidence for the formula of the Roman sponsio is enough to clear up lingering controversy about two otherwise obscure speeches preserved only in testimonia and fragments. The elder Cato wrote a speech whose title is variously cited by our sources: ‘si se Caelius tribunus plebis appellasset’; ‘in M. Caelium si se appellasset’; ‘contra M. Caelium’ ; ‘in Marcum Cae[ci]lium’. On the reasonable postulate that these are variations on a single original, the fullest expression is relatively easy to (...) reconstruct: ‘si se M. Caelius tribunus plebis appellasset’.Doubts about the sense of these words have led to more radical proposals which have little to recommend them, especially in view of the new analysis I intend to offer. The conclusion among those who have attempted to explain the obvious reading has been that the title of the speech is a condition contrary to fact referring to a hypothetical situation to which the speech responded: some have suggested that Cato wrote the speech against the possibility that Caelius might make an accusation against him; Antonio Cima suggested that Caelius had made a speech against Cato without naming him and that Cato had responded, ‘if Caelius had meant to refer to me… ’. (shrink)

Although this note is prompted by the recent exchange between Gellner [2], [3] and Needham [4], I shall ignore the issues raised by Gellner's specification for an ideal language. I am concerned here only with Needham's statement that ‘biology is one matter and descent is quite another, of a different order’ which, it will be remembered, Gellner treats as Needham's first error. I write under a sense of obligation, for I discussed this matter with Gellner in 1955 while he was (...) preparing his first article and my arguments then were phrased similarly to those advanced by Needham. It appears that I did not make myself clear to Gellner and I shall try again. I do not wish to attack or defend either protagonist; each is quite able to look after himself. Therefore I propose neither to examine where they have misunderstood each other, nor to discuss the difference between kinship and descent, but simply to state the connexion, as I see it, between physical and social kinship. (shrink)

The author deals with the meaning of metamerism. Two contrary points of view may serve to clear the problem. From the morphological point of view probably outgrowth of the organism in longitudinal direction has led to the development of metameres. So the first segmentation is due to a functional differentiation. In Phylogeny this segmentation has been maintained and the originally developed metameres remain the primary morphotic units of the organisms. Further specialising of function and organ-concentration destroyed the original absolute metamerism (...) and only left a rest of the original.The functional point of view renounces an original absolute metamerism for the present moment. It only asks for the functional meaning of the segmentation in organisms, showing this segmentation. From the functional point of view it is possible that metamerism may be the morphological expression of quite different functional requirements and that in one organism the metamerism starts from another system of organs than in another.Es wird gefragt welche Bedeutung die Metamerie haben kann. Zur Erläuterung des Problems werden zwei extremen Betrachtungsweisen einander gegenübergestellt. Nach der morphologischen Betrachtungsweise hat Wachstum der Organismen in die Länge wahrscheinlich zur Ausbildung der Metamerie geführt. Diese erste Metamerie ist wahrscheinlich ein funktioneller Differenzierungsprozess gewesen.In der Phylogenese hat sich diese Metamerie behauptet und die ursprünglich entstandene Metamere sind die primären morphotischen Einheiten der Organismen geblieben. Weitergehende Funktionsspezialisierung und Organkonzentration hat die ursprüngliche absolute Metamerie vernichtet. Was davon übrig blieb sind die Reste der ursprünglichen.Die funktioneile Betrachtungsweise verzichtet vorläufig auf eine ursprüngliche absolute Metamerie. Sie fragt bloss nach der funktionellen Bedeutung, welche die Metamerie besitzt bei denjenigen Organismen, wo diese gefunden wird. Sie achtet es möglich, dass Metamerie der Ausdruck sein kann von ganz verschiedenen funktionellen Anforderungen und dass somit die Metamerie bei der einen Tiergruppe von einem ganz anderen Organsystem ausgeht wei bei einer anderen. (shrink)

In his recent paper Gellner singles me out for special comment and some reply is called for. He attributes to me several propositions which he says I made in my note on ‘Physical and social kinship’ in this journal, and he then refutes them. Reading his paper I cannot avoid thinking that he exaggerates the differences between us, thereby apparently strengthening his argument. Some substantial differences there are, but others are fictional. A line-by-line analysis of what he says about me (...) in his paper might be amusing but would be of only ephemeral interest. In this reply I confine myself to a few important issues. (shrink)

(1890). MASHONALAND AND MATABELELAND.—FACTS AND FIGURES. Transactions of the South African Philosophical Society: Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 16-22.